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Constitutional – Legal Engineering of the Model 
of Democracy in North Macedonia
Abstract
This thesis is a critical analysis of the constitutional and legal order of the 
Republic of North Macedonia, following the chronological process dating 
from the gaining of the county’s independence, through the armed con-
fl ict in 2001 that brought constitutional changes, to today. The fi rst dec-
ade after the breakup of Yugoslavia was crucial for the North Macedonian 
state and its citizens. The writing/creation of the constitution of the new, 
independent state was not an easy process and it did not pass peacefully 
nor did it pass without any problems. The complex social process and rela-
tions have initiated the need for amendments to the Constitution, which, 
since its adoption in 1991 until today, has been changed 32 times in order 
to adapt to new, emerging situations and to give constitutional and legal 
responses to the inherent challenges. Of course, proper changes also oc-
curred in the political system itself as a result of numerous factors, which 
have more or less infl uenced its character and shape.
Keywords: Democracy, Consociational Democracy, Constitutional Order
Introduction
From the moment independence was secured, the electoral model in 
the Republic of Macedonia, as an important element of the electoral sys-
tem in the wider sense of the word, has undergone numerous transforma-
tions; from a majority principle election model in two rounds, to a pro-
portional representation with closed lists. In the fi rst parliamentary elec-
tions in 1990 and the second in 1994, the allocation of mandates was car-
ried out by applying the majority principle election model in two rounds, 
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within unanimous electoral units. The Law on the Election of Members 
of Parliament in the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia since 1998 
has abandoned the majority electoral model and replaced it with the com-
bined (mixed) electoral model, according to which 85 seats were allocated 
on the basis of the majority electoral model with a relative majority, and 
35 MP seats, on the proportional model. In the 2001 elections held after 
the armed confl ict and after the adoption of the Framework Agreement 
and the constitutional amendments (as well as all subsequent elections) 
the proportional election model was applied. Today, according to the deci-
sions in the Electoral Code adopted in 2006 and amended several times 
since then, a proportional electoral model is applied within six constitu-
encies in which twenty deputies and three constituencies in the Diaspora 
are elected, from which three MPs can be elected.
The process of building the Macedonian state went through two differ-
ent phases, which had something in common: the transition to democracy 
and democratic consolidation. In the fi rst period, the Republic of Mace-
donia was oriented towards western liberal democracy, building a politi-
cal system dominated by the elements and characteristics of the majority 
democracy. Of course, the fi rst multi-party elections were preceded by 
a legal framework that guaranteed the freedom of political association, 
i.e., the formation of political parties as a necessary presumption for com-
petitive elections. In the 1991 Constitution, political pluralism and free, 
direct, and democratic elections were one of the eleven fundamental val-
ues of the constitutional order of the Republic of Macedonia.1
From 2001 to the present, in the conditions of a post-confl ict envi-
ronment, the political system was moving towards the so-called, power 
sharing model, with strong elements of the “Liphart Concept” for conso-
ciational democracy.
About Democracy
Democracy belongs to the ranks of the great politically-legal, ethically-
philosophical and sociological phenomena that have always attracted the 
attention of scientists from almost all socially humanitarian areas.2 The 
term ‘democracy’ is one of the most widely used concepts in both political 
science and everyday life, and is also a target. The use of this term leads 
to a great deal of confusion, since it tends to contort when trying to defi ne 
1  Article 8, paragraph 1, line 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 
from 1991.
2  D. Bajaldziev, Introduction to Law, Skopje 2009, p. 122.
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it.3 It is therefore no coincidence that in determining this concept there is 
almost always a striving for a specifi c defi nition or a certain characteristic 
that, as a whole, completes its meaning. Most simply defi ned as “rule by 
the people,” this form of social order has been subject to different, wide-
ranging defi nitions. Starting from a “bad and undesirable form of govern-
ment,” which is what Greek philosophers Plato4 and Aristotle5 considered 
it to be, through Jean Jacques Rousseau6 and Montesquieu’s7 concept that 
democracy is “a common good,” we come to today’s “era of democracy” 
for which speaks the fact that from 195 states, 125 declare themselves as 
democracies.8
During its more than 2,500-year history, democracy has been constant-
ly renewed and developed through various models of institutional imple-
mentation. Democracy is not invented at in one fell swoop, like a steam 
engine, but it has been created multiple times and in different societies.9 
But the widespread acceptance of democracy as an appropriate form of 
organisation of political life is one hundred and fi fty years old. Namely, 
the term “democracy” in its modern sense began to be used in the nine-
teenth century, signifying a system of representative democracy in which 
representatives were elected to fair and free elections. Historically, and 
through a wide variety of differences, today we can conclude that modern 
democracy rests on several values: participation as a broader concept that 
not only has strong political implications, but also that of the social and 
economic; majority rule and minority rights, which points to the fact that 
while democracy is by defi nition the rule of the majority, it must also take 
3  S. Klimovski, T. Karakamisheva, R. Desoska, Political System, Skopje 2010, p. 119.
4  Plato had criticises democracy in his dialogue “Republic”, wherein he says 
that democracy comes about when the poor majority will overthrow the wealthy mi-
nority, as an anarchic, colourful state order, when they share equality in all, regardless 
of both equals and the unequal. Because of this, he wrote, democracy is a bad form of 
government and is the backbone of tyranny as the worst possible form of state order.
5  Aristotle had a similar view of democracy as Plato, the difference being that, 
according to him, democracy can be a good form of ruling, but only if there is rule 
of law.
6  Rousseau believed that the basic principles of democracy are freedom and 
equality. In each community, the government should be in line with the people, and 
such a pact is an act of sovereignty that should lead to the common good.
7  Montesquieu argued for a division and balance between the executive, the leg-
islature and the judiciary, as a means of guaranteeing the freedom of the individual. 
This doctrine, later, would be the foundation for the creation of the US Constitution, 
with the division of power between the president, the Congress, and the judiciary.
8  Freedom In The World 2015, Discarding Democracy: Return to the Iron Fist, 
p. 8
9  R. Dahl, On Democracy, London 1998, p. 8.
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into account the rights of minority groups; the rule of law and fair trial, 
which ensures an autonomous legal order and a restriction of the powers 
of public authorities and the provision of fair access to an independent 
and fair judiciary; a commitment to human rights, whose respect, protec-
tion and fulfi lment must be secured by a democratic state; political plu-
ralism that can provide suffi ciently fl exible structures to adapt to changes 
but which still remain a stable basis for democratic governance; free and 
fair elections as the most basic and unique characteristic of democracy, 
through which every citizen can express their will for change, i.e., compli-
ance with current policies and participating in the ongoing process of as-
sessment; and the separation of powers between legislative, executive and 
judicial bodies that function independently, but who have responsibility 
towards each other and the people.
As a system of government, democracy is still the target of much criti-
cism to this day. Most of it moves in the same direction – not all citizens 
can be equally educated and informed about political life in a country, 
so it would not be benefi cial for them to make important decisions. One 
of the disadvantages is connected with the achievement of equality, the 
possibility of self-destruction as a result of its openness, as well as the 
problem with the majority government. More precisely, this pertains to 
whether there are certain limits that the majority cannot overstep and 
rights that it cannot take away from the minority by outvoting. The Ital-
ian philosophers Wilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, however, claim 
that democracy is just one facade that serves the political elites to mask 
reality.
However, the weaknesses of democracy are incomparably smaller than 
those of an undemocratic system of government, which gives it a huge 
advantage over others because democracy is, above all, a system over 
which the citizens have control. Former British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill was and is known for making the following memorable quip 
(among others) on democracy: “Democracy is the worst form of govern-
ment, except for all the others.” This well-known quote brings us to an 
important conclusion: the perfect democracy does not exist, but in spite 
of that, it is the most successful system of government.
Behaviour in accordance with the opinion of the majority, however, 
is not a central point of interest for the pluralist democracy. Namely, ac-
cording to this model, democracy exists when many organisations acting 
separately from the government put pressure on democracy, confronting 
it with its own interests and causing its reaction.10 Unlike the majority 
10  R. Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy, New Haven 1982, p. 5.
151
D. Kuqi, Constitutional – Legal Engineering of the Model of Democracy…
model, according to the supporters of pluralist democracy,11 instead of 
a centre of sovereign power, it is necessary to have more power centre, 
none of which are and cannot be sovereign. The pluralist model seeks to 
limit the actions of the majority, so that interest groups come to the fore. 
According to US political scientist Dahl, this is a model where decision-
making does not come from a single political centre that is in the role of 
a monopoly, but such power is distributed both vertically and horizon-
tally at a number of different levels of decision-making. What ensures the 
proper functioning of this model is the consensus for basic liberal values 
in political life. On the other hand, the majoritarian democracy is based 
on electoral mechanisms that turn the power of the majority into the abil-
ity to make political decisions. In this model of democracy, the wider pub-
lic (rather than interest groups) control the actions of the government.
The key principle of organising the rule of democratic systems is the 
division of power into the legislative, executive and judicial. The con-
sistency with which the government is divided, as well as the forms of 
their mutual control and cooperation, offers an answer to the question of 
what kind of institutional model of the political system is concerned. The 
relationship between legislative and executive power is essential for any 
political system. This relationship is not only determined by the consti-
tutional position of institutions, but also by political and other external 
factors. The constitution of a state is one that determines the horizontal 
relation between the legislature and the executive power, its powers and 
duties, as well as any possibilities for mutual infl uence.
When one system is said to be based on the principle of the separation 
of power, it means that the relations among the holders of state power 
are characterised by organisational and functional independence.12 All 
forms of state power organisation occurred via an empirical procedure. In 
time, the parliamentary system in England was shaped, followed by the 
presidential system in the United States, while the parliamentary system 
had its fi rst constitutional presence in Switzerland. Over time, there was 
some convergence of the systems to their approximation which resulted 
in mixed systems.13
The presidential system is a system of government based on the prin-
ciple of a strict separation of state power and the principle of “checks 
11  Although many scientists have, however, contributed to this model, pluralist 
democracy is most closely identifi ed with political scientist Robert Dahl.
12  S. Klimovski, R. Desoska, T. Karakamisheva, Constitutional Law, Skopje 2009, 
p. 344.
13  M. Jovicic, Parliamentary System vs. Presidential and Parliamentary System, “Ar-
chive for Legal and Social Sciences” 1992, Belgrade, p. 29.
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and balances”14 between the legislative, the executive, and the judicial 
powers. This system fi nds its original form in the United States, which 
today may be the only successful presidential system of governance. For 
the parliamentary system, the existence of a fl exible division of power is 
characteristic and which is expressed by equality, cooperation and mutual 
infl uence between the legislative and the executive powers. This system 
was created in England, and consistency in its application is observed 
in both Japan and Italy. Today it appears in many varieties and shapes 
in countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, India, and Ger-
many. The parliamentary system is built on the unity of power, where the 
Parliament is the sole holder of the legislative process, with no other state 
body having the right to abolish or annul the laws and the highest acts. 
The Assembly elects, i.e., appoints the executive bodies that are then held 
accountable to it. This particular system of government exists today in 
Switzerland. Mixed systems are characterised by combined elements of 
the presidential and parliamentary systems. The most important feature 
in this system is the position of the head of state as the basic institution of 
the system. In addition, there is a fl exible division of power and political 
responsibility of the government in the parliament. The mixed system 
has its roots in France, and its example was followed by Portugal, Russia, 
Poland, Ukraine, and other Eastern European countries.
The Constitutional Legal Framework of the Model 
of Democracy in the Republic of Macedonia
On November 17th, 1991, the Constitution of the Republic of Mac-
edonia, which was preceded by the Declaration of a Sovereign and In-
dependent State, was adopted. The precursor of the Constitution of the 
independent Republic of Macedonia were the constitutional amendments 
adopted in August 1990, which created a legal framework for starting the 
transition of the state from socialism to democracy and from the federal 
state of SFRY to an independent state. This Constitution, according to 
its conception, is among the liberal democratic constitutions that were 
adopted during the nineteenth century and, with certain changes, have 
continued to rule to this day in democratic countries.15 In the philoso-
phy of this Constitution, the central value was the liberal democracy with 
a parliamentary form. At the same time, the Preamble of the Constitution 
starts from the historical fact and the historical and legal continuity of 
14  The principle “checks and balances” ensures that no authority is too powerful 
and each authority is limited in power.
15  S. Klimovski, R. Desoska, T. Karakamisheva, op. cit., p. 181.
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the Macedonian state as a national state of the Macedonian people, which 
ensures full civic equality and permanent coexistence of the Macedonian 
people with Albanian, Turkish, Vlach, and Roma people, along with other 
nationalities who live in the Republic of Macedonia.
In the period after becoming independent, the Republic of Macedonia 
faced many challenges as a new independent state that was created on the 
basis of the right to self-determination after the break-up of SFR Yugosla-
via. After a proclamation of independence, the country began moving to-
wards the development of a parliamentary democracy, where the freedom 
of political association was guaranteed for the fi rst time, that is, the for-
mation of several political parties as subjects in an election contest. The 
Assembly became unicameral, and instead of the collective presidency of 
the Republic of Macedonia, the position of President of the Republic was 
introduced. The Executive Council became a government, and the sec-
retariats were renamed to ministries.16 This precisely was the establish-
ment of the elements of the next parliamentary system. Set on the basis 
of the already well-built democracies, the Macedonian Constitution in-
troduced a system of “checks and balances” with the separation of power 
into executive, legislative, and judicial powers.17
The relatively short-lived experience of Macedonian parliamentarism 
and democracy once again proves that the actual power and relations of 
the Macedonian institutions depend mostly on the constitutional norms 
but not only. During most of President Kiro Gligorov’s mandate, the sys-
tem of governance de facto functioned as presidential.18 President Gli-
gorov’s personality and social democratic parliamentary majority in the 
period of 1992–1998 enabled him to play the leading role in making im-
portant decisions.
With the Constitution of 1991, the Republic of Macedonia was defi ned 
as a sovereign, independent, democratic, and social state. The funda-
mental values of the constitutional order were provided through 11 basic 
principles. According to this, the socio-economic and political system is 
based on the principle of the rule of law, human freedoms and rights, 
the separation of power, the market economy and other fundamental val-
ues of a modern, democratic society. The adoption of this Constitution 
marked the beginning of the construction of a new social and political 
system, as well as a new political and economic strategy for the develop-
16  B. Vankovska, Political system of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje 2014, p. 154.
17  T. Chokrevski, Redefi nition of the Function of Law in Countries in Transition: the 
Case of the Republic of Macedonia, “Balkan Forum”, no. 2/1996, p. 148.
18  G. Siljanovska Davkova, Modern “models” of organization of government: dilem-
mas and challenges, UDK 342.25/28, Izvorniznanstveni rad, 2010, p. 377.
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ment of the state. But has this Constitution passed the test of time? Dur-
ing its existence of 25 years (so far), the Constitution has been amended 
on seven occasions, and it currently has 32 amendments. Under pressure 
from the Republic of Greece, as well as the pretensions for membership in 
the United Nations, in 1992, two amendments were adopted that referred 
to the fact that Macedonia had no territorial pretensions towards other 
countries and that it would not interfere with the internal affairs of other 
countries.
The most dominant and dramatic changes came about in 2001, when 
the principles and rules of the Framework Agreement were embedded. 
Namely, 15 existing Articles were amended; those related mostly to the 
issues of using languages and alphabets, cultivating one’s own ethnic 
identity, the use of symbols, the mechanisms of political decision making 
in the selection of important state functions and bodies, and the forma-
tion of separate parliamentary bodies. Primarily, an amendment to the 
constitutional preamble was made, which established the multi-ethnic 
character of the state. The amendment of 2004 provided constitutional 
protection of the freedom and inviolability of letters and all other forms 
of communication, and one could deviate from this right only by court 
decision. As a result of the efforts for Euro-Atlantic integration, reforms 
in the judiciary were carried out in 2005, i.e., the defi nition of courts, the 
election and dismissal of judges, the establishment of the judicial council 
and the guarantee of the right of appeal. In 2009, the presidential electoral 
threshold was reduced from 50% to 40%, and, with the amendments in 
2011, was provided the possibility of the extradition of Macedonian citi-
zens on the basis of a ratifi ed international agreement via court decision.
The Political System in the Republic 
of Macedonia 2001 – Today
The Republic of Macedonia was the only state that got through the 
breakup of Yugoslavia without suffering military confl ict and bloodshed. 
However, since gaining independence, many domestic and internation-
al commentators have often warned of an imminent crisis or confl ict in 
Macedonia.19 The inter-ethnic tension that has dragged on in the past 
escalated with an eight-month military confl ict in 2001, which was the 
most critical point Macedonia faced after its independence. The confl ict 
ended with the ratifi cation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) 
that established a framework for inter-ethnic coexistence and a Euro-
19  Separation of powers and implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, Skopje 
2008, p. 9.
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Atlantic view of the state. This agreement was, in principle, accepted by 
both sides of the confl ict as the only alternative for Macedonia and its 
citizens. The solutions scheduled in the agreement, later embedded in the 
constitutional amendments, meant extending the rights of communities 
but also meant redesigning the political system. Crucial for post-confl ict 
reconstruction is the conciliation of ethnic groups and the reintegration 
of the people. The success of this process is infl uenced by the separation 
of powers as well as the cooperation among the ethnic groups and their 
leaving the past behind.
It can be said that in the fi rst decade of independence, ethnic Albani-
ans were excluded from the decision-making process in the country. They 
were less represented in the public administration, and the use of the Al-
banian language in the Parliament and in higher education was banned. 
Instead, the power of the Albanian politicians was highly limited through 
the ministries, which was a particular trick to proving their legitimacy 
in front of the largest minority in Macedonia.20 Most of the concepts of 
democracy are based on the principle of the “rule of the people”, but since 
1991, when the fi rst Constitution was adopted and, until 2001, almost no 
one disputed that “the people” primarily meant “the majority”, that is, 
the ethnic Macedonians who comprised 64.2% of the population, unlike 
Albanians who accounted for 25.2% and other minorities including Turks, 
Roma, Vlachs, Serbs and Bosniaks.21 This was part of the reason behind 
the military confl ict.
The aim of the Ohrid Agreement was not only to end military action 
and establish peace, but was also a treaty that the Macedonian Constitu-
tion set on a new basis. Namely, the agreement provided a series of con-
stitutional changes that were adopted by the Macedonian Assembly in 
late 2001 and early 2002. Thus, the offi cial language was considered to be 
the one spoken by more than 20% of the population, a double-majority 
system for the crucial areas of the legislation was introduced, which was 
composed of the majority of votes in the Assembly and of the majority of 
votes from the representatives of the minority, equitable representation 
in the public administration was also introduced and new reforms for 
decentralisation in Macedonia were anticipated.
In order to achieve equitable representation in the public administra-
tion and in the police forces, the political elites agreed on a system of 
20  S. Ripiloski, S. Pendarovski, Macedonia and the Ohrid Framework Agreement: 
Framed Past, Elusive Future, “Perceptions”, Summer 2013, vol. XVIII, no. 2, p. 136.
21  M. Maleska, Multiethnic democracy in Macedonia: political analysis and emerging 
scenarios, “New Balkan Politics”, issue 13/2013, p. 7.
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quotas based on ethnic lines. In the laws that regulate employment in the 
public administration, measures were implemented that would ensure an 
equitable representation of communities in all central and local public 
bodies and at all levels of employment in those bodies, while respecting 
the rules of competence and integrity according to which the public ad-
ministration is managed.
After gaining independence in 1991, the Republic of Macedonia ex-
perienced a high degree of centralisation that had a negative impact on 
local development and imposed the need for an immediate start of the 
decentralisation process. The development of the decentralised govern-
ment was also foreseen with the OFA through which the powers of the 
elected local representatives would be strengthened and their responsibil-
ities would be signifi cantly increased in accordance with the Constitution 
and the European Charter of Local Self-Government, refl ecting the prin-
ciple of vertical organisation, which is currently valid in the European 
Union.22 This move meant increasing the participation of the citizens 
in democratic life as well as ensuring greater respect for the identity of 
the communities. This gave greater autonomy to the communities with 
a predominantly Albanian population, provided greater inclusion of the 
non-dominant groups at the local level, and the map of the municipalities 
received territorial reorganisation. The process of decentralisation in the 
Republic of Macedonia began with the adoption of the Law on Local Self-
Government,23 the Law on Local Self-Government Financing,24 the Law 
on the City of Skopje25 and, lastly, but very importantly, the Law on the 
Territorial Organisation of the Republic of Macedonia and Defi nition of 
Areas of Local Self-Government.26 The Law on Local Self-Government 
defi nes the responsibilities of the municipalities. According to this law, 
“the municipalities independently, within the framework of the law, regu-
late and perform activities of public interest with local importance, deter-
mined by this or other laws and are responsible for their performance.”
The implementation of the decentralisation process in Macedonia 
started with the so-called “zero phase”, i.e., the phase in which the mini-
mum necessary fi nancial management capacities were provided by the 
municipalities. Later there followed the fi rst phase, which required the 
taking over of property and obligations in relation to the decentralised 
competencies as did the second phase in which the municipalities took 
22  See: Ohrid Framework Agreement: paragraph 3.1.
23  “Offi cial Gazette of RM”, no. 5/02.
24  Ibidem, no. 61/04.
25  Ibidem, no. 55/04.
26  Ibidem, no. 55/04.
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decision-making powers regarding the functioning of budget users. De-
spite these reforms, the question arises as to whether local government can 
develop at the level of cultural autonomy along ethnic lines? If we were to 
analyse the adopted laws, we would likely come to the conclusion that it 
would be diffi cult to happen. First of all, the Constitution27 and the Law 
on Local Self-Government28 guarantee a single local government except 
for the City of Skopje, operating as a separate unit. Subsequently, the Law 
on Fiscal Decentralisation did not provide fully autonomous fi nancing 
of the municipalities, and the Law on Territorial Organisation of the Lo-
cal Self-Government did not start from the criteria for creating absolute 
ethnic municipalities.29
In the next few years after the signing of the OFA, there followed 
a completely new dynamic between the political elites. The new coali-
tion government that was formed after the 2002 elections comprised of 
the SDSM and the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) and had 
an Albanian Education Minister for the fi rst time.30 This carried great 
symbolic signifi cance for the Albanian population, whose issue of higher 
education being in the Albanian language was ignored.31 The SDSM and 
DUI had a common agenda for reforms in education, which they had ne-
gotiated even before the founding of the coalition that they followed over 
the subsequent four years. In this way, the government coalition partners 
had joint participation in the decision-making process, which is also in-
dicated by the fact that a majority of Albanian MPs are needed to enact all 
laws related to education.
The parliamentary elections in 2006 brought forth a new course of 
events. In these elections an opposition that was led by VMRO-DPMNE 
(the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic 
Party of Macedonian National Unity) won, and which later formed a coa-
lition government with the DPA (the Democratic Party of Albanians). 
From a legal point of view, this coalition was not illegal, but it was par-
tially illegitimate, because the winner of the Albanian political camp was 
the DUI with 16 MPs, while the DPA had only 11 MPs. This actually 
caused a sense of injustice among the ranks of the DUI as they thought 
27  Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, Article 117.
28  Law on Local Self-Government, Article 4.
29  See: Separation of powers and implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Skopje 2008, pp. 211–212.
30 Azis Polozani was elected as Minister of education and science of the Republic 
of Macedonia, who performed this function from 1 November 2002 to 6 July 2006.
31  C. Koneska, Vetoes, Ethnic Bidding, Decentralisation: Post-Confl ict Education 
in Macedonia, “Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe”, vol. 11, 
no. 4/2012, p. 40.
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that they should become part of the government. One of the most illus-
trative examples of the standstill in political dialogue in the Republic of 
Macedonia was the case of the so-called “May Agreement” in 2007. The 
background of this agreement was the OFA itself, which did not provide 
any specifi c provisions about the issue of which political factors should 
form the government after the parliamentary elections, although by 2006, 
the unwritten rule was that the winners in the two ethnic campuses in 
the country would do it. In 2007, the DUI MPs left the Assembly of the 
Republic of Macedonia as a sign of protest against the legislation passed 
by the Badinter principle, but without their votes. After that, the DUI im-
mediately requested negotiations on an “inter-ethnic” level with the Gov-
ernment, as a prerequisite for their return to the Assembly.32 Although 
a formal agreement was never made available to the public, nor did its 
formal signing ever occur, the achievement of this agreement resulted in 
the return of all of the DUI MPs to the Parliament of the Republic of 
Macedonia on 30th May 2007 and the normalisation of the political dia-
logue and the situation in Republic of Macedonia. This was proved by the 
coalition between the VMRO-DPMNE and the DUI after the fi rst early 
parliamentary elections in 2008.
Although some political experts believed that Macedonia had under-
gone the democratisation process33 by 2008, in 2012 the so-called “Black 
Monday” happened to the Assembly, that is, a crisis that arose during the 
adoption of the 2013 budget. Namely, the political dialogue within the 
framework of the commission debate faced a dead end in the moments 
when the opposition MPs submitted 1,200 amendments, stating that the 
budget was unproductive and full of spending that did not stimulate eco-
nomic growth. After it became clear that the budget could not be passed 
under normal circumstances, the ruling VMRO-DPMNE used its posi-
tion of being the majority in the Parliament to ignore all of the amend-
ments of the opposition, while skipping the amendment debate and hav-
ing a meeting in an emergency session about a new budget proposal. This 
move revolted opposition MPs, who boycotted the chamber even before 
the start of the session. They stated that they would stand in front of the 
Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia and that they would not allow 
a violation of the Constitution, the law, or the Rules of Procedure. This 
led to a reaction from security agents in that they physically removed the 
opposition MPs and the media from the Assembly Hall. The problem 
32  N. Markovic, M. Popovic, Political Dialogue, Skopje 2015, p. 26.
33  See: S. Levitsky, L. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism Hybrid Regimes after the 
Cold War, Harvard 2010, p. 127.
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itself was solved by the formation of a committee on the proposal of the 
President of the Republic of Macedonia, which included two representa-
tives of the opposition and the government, and chaired by the Dean of 
the Faculty of Law in Skopje. After a long session, the Commission drew 
up a report that was subsequently submitted to and accepted by the As-
sembly of the Republic of Macedonia. This event blocked Macedonia’s 
progress towards EU membership. The latest political crisis in the Re-
public of Macedonia took place after the early parliamentary elections in 
2014, where the coalition led by VMRO-DPMNE won again. After the 
elections, opposition party SDSM boycotted the Assembly of the Republic 
of Macedonia stating that the elections had been unfair and undemocratic 
and passed numerous remarks on the election process. However, after the 
boycott, the leaders of the two largest parties in the Republic of Macedo-
nia, SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE, tried to negotiate the return of SDSM 
to the front bench, but these negotiations were unsuccessful.34 This event 
was a major challenge for Macedonia’s parliamentary democracy.
Such events overshadowed the stability of the Assembly as a forum for 
interparty dialogue. In the absence of an opposition, a question arose: Can 
an Assembly of that composition pass quality laws? In a sound, democratic 
system, the function of the opposition may be of the utmost importance, 
because it has the role of a “check” that is aimed at stopping the making 
of bad decisions in the legislature. From the recent crises in the political 
life of the Republic of Macedonia, we can conclude that the government 
and the opposition have never been in such a tense and hostile relation-
ship. Constant mutual accusations, non-deviation of requests, as well as 
the refusal of a common compromise, lead us to the conclusion that the 
political scene in Macedonia has turned into a military front. The real test 
that Macedonia’s democracy is faced with is whether both sides are fi ght-
ing for personal interests or for the interests of the people.
Elements of Consociational Democracy 
in North Macedonia – Issues, Challenges and Experiences
Considering the differences and fragmentation of the Macedonian soci-
ety, one can conclude that Macedonia does not naturally gravitate towards 
a system of parliamentary democracy. Instead, a political system is needed 
that will correspond to a deeply divided society such as that of Macedo-
nia’s. Such political systems are based on the principles of consensual or 
consociational democracy, where the majority that decides refl ects the 
34  N. Markovic, M. Popovic, op. cit., p. 29.
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more dimensional differences that are prevailing in society. Parliamentary 
democracy guarantees effectiveness, but in fragmented societies, consen-
sus democracy is needed for stability. 
Consociational democracy is characterised by four features: (1) A great 
coalition of political leaders of all of the more important segments of 
a certain pluralistic society is in power; (2) Mutual veto or principle of 
the majority of like-minded individuals that functions as an additional 
protection of vital minority interests; (3) Proportionality as a basic meas-
ure in determining political representation when appointing civil serv-
ants and allocating public funds; and (4) A high degree of independence 
of the segments in solving internal issues.35 The main characteristic of the 
great coalition is the association and mutual agreement of political lead-
ers, who then jointly participate in the management of plural societies. 
The power of veto maintains a balance because it allows for the protection 
of minority groups from being outvoted. The principle of proportionality 
is an important element when it comes to decision making because it is 
an unbiased measure through which the more important functions are 
assigned to different segments. The independence of the segments is an 
element that increases their autonomy because it gives them the opportu-
nity to decide on issues that are at the level of a particular minority. This 
means that issues of common interest are resolved jointly, and all other 
issues are left to the segments.
Consociational democracy corresponds mostly to small countries, that 
is, to countries that are located on small territories and have small popula-
tions.
In fact, this is proven by the example of the countries in which this 
model of democracy was established. The basic reason lies in the fact that 
a small territory reinforces the spirit of cooperation and agreement be-
tween the political elites. Namely, in such conditions, the decision-mak-
ing process is much simpler because the political elites know each other 
well and are more likely to have a face-to-face encounter. In addition, 
small countries have limited international power, feel more threatened 
than the great powers, and therefore refrain from active foreign policy 
and strive to maintain and strengthen internal stability. However, this 
model of democracy can exist in those pluralist and multi-ethnic socie-
ties, provided that the majority of the minority group allows it an active 
role in the overall political life of the state especially.
As favourable factors that infl uence the establishment and mainte-
nance of consociational democracy, Arend Lijphart lists several condi-
35  S. Klimovski, T. Karakamisheva, R. Deskoska, op. cit., p. 142.
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tions including: the balance of power between segments; a small territory 
of the concerned country; separation of segments; tradition in conclud-
ing agreements between elites; comprehensive loyalty; the existence of 
crossed gaps and the like.36 These elements, as he points out, should not 
be required nor necessary to create conditions for a consociational de-
mocracy, since they can also be part of non-consociational democracies 
just as they may be absent in consociational democracies. But the more 
elements are present, the better the chances for the stability of democracy 
in a pluralist society.
Lijphart’s approach to democracy in divided societies is at the centre 
of many post-confl ict institutional arrangements in recent decades, in-
cluding Macedonia, which, since 2001, has introduced some of the main 
principles of separation of powers.37 In fact, we can notice the traces of 
consociation in the period up to 2001, for example, through the great rul-
ing coalition, i.e., the automatic participation in the power of an Albanian 
party, regardless of the election results. The existence of special quotas 
and other appropriate measures was part of the government’s programme 
of just representation of non-majority communities through positive dis-
crimination. Although decentralisation was foreseen with the OFA, the 
local self-government persisted beforehand. By concluding the Frame-
work Agreement, the political system in the Republic of Macedonia was 
redesigned, which resulted in the crystallisation of the elements of conso-
ciational democracy. Although the great coalition was not provided by the 
Constitution, it became a tradition since the fi rst elections in independent 
Macedonia. This is due to several factors. Fistly a coalition government 
was an inevitability because of the proportional election model and frag-
mentation in the political system.
The formation of a majority government is almost impossible, so the 
forming of coalition governments became the rule. In addition, the im-
plementation of the executive power is always easier if there is support 
from the smaller joint parties. Furthermore, after the signing of the OFA, 
a mechanism for the protection of minority communities in Macedonia 
was provided, through the veto power, i.e., the so-called Badinter princi-
ple. To avoid any discrimination of these communities, they have a veto 
power that allows them to control the decision-making process for which 
they have a particular interest. In such situations, the required number of 
36  M.P. Schendelen, C. M. Consociational, Democracy: The Views of Arend Lijphart 
and Collected Criticisms, “The Political Science Reviewer”, no. 15/1985, pp. 143–184, 
https://politicalsciencereviewer.wisc.edu/index.php/psr/article/view/21.
37  C. Koneska, Vetoes, Ethnic Bidding, Decentralisation: Post-Confl ict Education in Mace-
donia, “Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe”, vol. 11, no. 4/2012.
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votes must be provided by the present members of the minority commu-
nities. Equitable representation of the members of the communities was raised 
at the level of the fundamental value of the constitutional order. The pro-
portionality was set as the basic standard in political representation, in 
the distribution of public funds as well as employment in the public sec-
tor, especially in sectors such as education and internal affairs. However, 
in practice, this principle began to be achieved through the adoption of 
mechanical solutions where ethnicity played a greater role than expertise, 
education, and experience. This put democracy in question and clashed 
with the principle of non-discrimination. The autonomy of the segments was 
ensured through the decentralisation process that began after 2001. This 
was achieved through the transfer of certain competencies and fi nance 
from the central to the local government, as well as greater participation 
of the citizens at a local level. It is important to note that this process also 
developed an ethnic dimension, since not only a two-thirds majority, but 
also a double majority was provided for decision making on issues related 
to local self-government. The proportional electoral model was applied for 
the fi rst time after electoral reforms in 2002. Although this model was not 
provided by the OFA, it was assumed that its application would create 
preconditions for a successful consociational democracy in the country.
However, there are several elements of a consociational democracy that 
Macedonian society lacks. Before the formal ratifi cation of the OFA, some 
experts desperately tried to explain why the famous “Lijphart Recipe” 
would not properly function in a binationally divided state such as Mac-
edonia.38 The fi rst and most important element is the balance of the power 
of the segments. Thus, in the foreground, the two largest communities 
are included, i.e., the Macedonian and Albanian communities, while the 
rest are left out of political arrangements. We can notice that smaller com-
munities are taken into account only in cases where a double majority 
cannot be secured. Furthermore, even though political pluralism became 
a fi xture of the Macedonian political scene after independence had been 
secured, we can freely say that ethnic division resulted in the creation of 
two political (i.e., ethical) blocs. Despite that, there is no balance of power 
between the executive and legislative powers, as the Government domi-
nates over the Parliament in political processes. The Assembly over the 
past period of more than two decades, instead of becoming a controlling 
38  B. Vankovska, The Procrustean Bed of the State Building in the Republic of Mace-
donia (1991–2011), in: The Macedonian Question: 20 Years of Political Struggle into Euro-
pean Integration Structures, eds. Z. Daskalovski, M. Risteska, Libertas, Rangendingen 
2012, p. 14.
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body, has become a body strictly controlled by the government.39 This 
is partly due to the fact that about 90% of the draft bills come from the 
government, which is partly a result of the weak position of parliamen-
tary committees. As for the second holder of the executive power – the 
president does not have powerful mechanisms for controlling the As-
sembly, and his veto power can be easily rejected. If we look at the case 
with other countries where consensus democracy has been established, 
we will notice that the legislative body has a strong independent posi-
tion compared to other government structures, but de facto it is not so. 
For example, the Swiss Constitution explicitly gives a powerful and in-
dependent position to the federal assembly, but really the power of the 
legislature is selective.
From the abovementioned, we can conclude that the political system 
in the Republic of Macedonia is moving in the direction of a consocia-
tional democracy, but it still deviates from the Lijphart’s model in certain 
criteria. If the fi rst decade of independence was about the parliamentary 
system, post military confl ict the Macedonian system gained strong ele-
ments of power sharing, that is, of a consociational democracy, through 
the Framework Agreement and constitutional amendments. The shape of 
governance is constantly evolving, developing and changing and for this 
reason, this issue remains open to debate. As the situation on Macedonian 
soil has changed in the past 25 years, the political system itself has taken 
its own form, adapting itself to the newly emerging situation. However, 
I believe that we are yet to learn what kind of model is best for Macedonia 
as a heterogeneous society composed of different ethnic, linguistic, cul-
tural, and religious groups.
Conclusions
The political system in the North Macedonia, both from a normative 
point of view and from a realistic point of view, is a result of the mutual 
infl uence of several factors that determine its essence. At different periods 
of time, these factors played greater or lesser roles, but the fi nal result was 
a refl ection of their overall impact. The fi rst Macedonian Constitution 
in practice adopted a radical systemic change as a result of the changed 
international and domestic social and political environment. The need 
to create a new constitutional framework also appeared on Macedonian 
soil, due to the transition from socialist one-party systems to democracy. 
The Constitution has undergone many changes in the form of numerous 
39  N. Ambarkov, The Republic of Macedonia, Consociational (consensual) enough?, 
“Iustinianus Primus Law Review”, vol. 5:1, p. 6.
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amendments that followed the transformation of the modern Macedonian 
state. The 2001 armed confl ict resulted in the creation of a new relation 
of relationships in Macedonian society in which multiethnicity and the 
civic concept require a compromise that is most easily achieved by the 
application of the most characteristic elements of the model of consocia-
tional democracy.
The construction of power took place through elections, but the elec-
toral model changed several times, starting from the majority, through 
one combined, to a proportional one. This consensus characteristic was 
aimed at refl ecting the ethnic and religious diversity of Macedonian so-
ciety.
The fl exible separation of powers as a feature of the parliamentary sys-
tem can be seen in the mutual control of the three powers. Thus, the 
Assembly controls the executive power through the parliamentary ques-
tions, as it does interpellation, votes of no-confi dence of the Govern-
ment, the election and dismissal of the President and members of the 
Government, the right to ask the President of the Republic for an opinion 
on issues within his jurisdiction as well as through the right to raise an 
impeachment for the President of the Republic in case of any violation 
of the Constitution and laws. The Assembly affects the judiciary mainly 
through the adoption of the Law on the Courts which determines the type 
and number of courts, and further still by determining the court budget, 
and also through the election of a public prosecutor and the election of 
three out of fi fteen members of the Judicial Council. The Government 
enters the legislative branch by proposing the budget, proposing laws, 
giving a mandatory opinion on draft bills, participating in the work of 
the Assembly, and by the right to request a session. The President, on the 
other hand, infl uences the legislative power through the suspensive veto 
power of laws that are adopted with a relative or absolute majority, in ad-
dition to leading the appointment and dismissal of the Government and 
the appointment and dismissal of offi cials during military emergencies 
and state of emergency.
From this we can conclude that the Macedonian system is a hybrid 
model in which the elements of parliamentary and consociational democ-
racy are combined. Leaving liberal democracy, the Macedonian system 
of regulation was moving towards a power-sharing model which, in post-
confl ict societies, is supported above all by the international community 
as an optimal solution to the demands for secession and the right to self-
determination. The separation of powers does not mean that institutions 
share their tasks and then act without consulting and cooperating with 
each other. On the contrary; the power-sharing model indicates that each 
165
D. Kuqi, Constitutional – Legal Engineering of the Model of Democracy…
authority consults with others in the decision-making process. We have 
noted the basic principles that apply to this concept through the devel-
opment of the decentralised government, non-discrimination and equi-
table representation in the public administration, as well as confi dence-
building measures to overcome the consequences of the 2001 confl ict. 
However, the most important element was the double-majority system, 
which requires the agreement of the minorities that are represented in 
Parliament to make crucial decisions. This system was originally pro-
posed by Robert Badinter, former president of the French Constitutional 
Court, who was involved in the drafting of the Ohrid Agreement in July 
2001. The purpose of this principle was to link the ethnic communities 
to the national legislative body for making decisions that are of particu-
lar importance to minority communities. The advantage of “Badinter’s 
Principle” was that with such relatively restrictive regulation, the dan-
ger of the majority group’s domination of decisions that have a direct 
impact on minorities was limited. On the other hand, it has brought the 
danger that the majority can still impose its will on issues that do not 
require a double majority. Although this principle was well thought out 
for a post-confl ict society like Macedonia’s, some analysts believe that it 
fails when dealing with the equitable representation of minority com-
munities.40 Namely, the Albanian minority had the loudest voice when 
making these decisions, while the rest were neglected. As for the other 
principles of the separation of powers, in the sensitive areas of public 
administration, especially the police, the number of Albanians employed 
in the civil services and state administration remained low during the 
1990s. Thus, public administration reform was considered crucial and 
aimed at strengthening the sense of belonging to the state. Before the 
Ohrid Agreement, only 7% of public administration employees were Al-
banians, and the representation of other minorities, such as the Turks 
and Roma, was also very low. The reasons for this phenomenon were 
multiple and cannot be reduced only to a matter of discrimination. How-
ever, it is a fact that nationality played a role, and for this reason Albani-
ans primarily sought employment in the private sector. With the OFA, 
this picture has changed drastically. Thus, the representation of 2.5% of 
Albanians in the Ministry of Interior as of 2001 rose to more than 10% 
in the fi rst half of 2003. Other state institutions followed suit. Also, al-
though the Army was excluded from the reforms for just representation, 
it received many more Albanians in its ranks.
40   F. Bieber, Partial Implementation, Partial Success: The Case of Macedonia, 2005, 
in: Power Sharing: New Challenges For Divided Societies, eds. D. Russell, I. O’Flynn, 
London 2005, pp. 107-122. 
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According to the political analyst Florian Bieber, the principle of sepa-
ration of powers existed in Macedonia before the military confl ict, but 
with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, it only got a formal 
character.41 The Republic of Macedonia is still a young democracy that 
makes continuous efforts to adjust its system to the current circumstances 
in Macedonian society. So far, the Constitution has been fl exible enough 
to accommodate the major changes that have been happening both po-
litically and socially. The real test is whether it will be strong enough to 
maintain the basic principles, thereby providing a stable system.
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